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MEASURING OF DAMAGES FROM
DRILLING AND PRODUCING OPERATIONS
The topic of this paper may have deceived you into believing 
that I will be able to give you a standard of measurement for 
damages resulting from drilling or production. If so, you are 
certain to be disappointed. These damages cannot be measured 
as time is measured by a clock, distance by miles, or volume 
by bushels. There is not any good statutory law classifying the 
damages or the amounts that are payable for any specific damage, 
and even the general rules as enunciated by the courts are con-
flicting and confusing. To use the magnificent understatement 
of American Jurisprudence, "the cases cannot be reconciled."
There are confusions, contradictions and differences, depending 
upon what basis of liability the court happened to apply in a 
given case. There are different bases for permanent or tem-
porary injuries.
A part of this confusion arises out of the effort of the 
courts to apply existing concepts of the law to oil and gas 
problems which did not exist at the time the traditional rules 
of law were formulated.
Further variance in the rules of damages occurs depending 
on the concept of liability adopted by a given court.
In some cases liability is seen to arise as the result of 
a breach of contract under the clause providing for payment for
surface damage. In other cases it is considered under the 
law of nuisance. Some treat liability as coming under the 
law of negligence. Then there is the classification of wil-
ful misconduct and the notion of liability without fault.
There have been cases where the court, with sublime disregard 
for the granting clause of the lease, has treated the lessee 
as a trespasser, apparently treating as immaterial the granting 
clause which grants the entire premises to the lessee for the 
purpose of exploration and recovery of oil or gas. Implicit, 
in some of the decisions at least, appears to be an assumption 
that the lessor and lessee are embattled adversaries without 
mutual aims, and that the lessee is somehow imposing on the 
lessor. There does not seem to be a recognition of the fact 
that the owner of surface and minerals who makes a lease has 
hopes of a fortune from underground discovery. The failure 
on the part of courts to recognize this results in an attitude 
that the lessor should not be burdened with any of the con-
sequences of efforts to produce that wealth. If the surface 
owner is not the mineral owner, then he has parted with the 
minerals and the concomitant rights for a consideration which 
he considered adequate, or else he has purchased the surface 
knowing those rights are outstanding and presumably has re-
duced the purchase price accordingly. In either case he should 
share, it would seem, in the disadvantages of lease activities.
It is not surprising that the courts have attempted to 
apply age-old concepts of law to the oil and gas business. The
lease form itself is an adaptation of the law of landlord and 
tenant simply because there was no law concerning oil and gas 
at the time of the discovery of these interests in real pro-
perty. Nevertheless, we know that an oil and gas lease does 
not create exactly the status of landlord and tenant, nor 
does all of the law of the landlord and tenant apply to oil 
and gas leases. For instance, if the landlord and tenant rule 
that the tenant cannot question the title of his landlord were 
strictly applied, there would be no such thing as a protection 
lease, for it would create a double liability for royalty.
With the development of the oil and gas industry, the 
courts are beginning to recognize that there is and should be 
a body of law particularly applicable to the oil and gas in-
dustry and the relationships between the surface owner, the 
mineral owner and the lessee. It has been said that the owner-
ship of real property is like a bundle of sticks in that it is 
comprised of a number of separate rights, all of which may be 
owned by one person. Almost invariably in oil and gas matters, 
however, there is a division of the sticks among two or more 
owners. Each owner will naturally seek to make his stick the 
most important and to secure for himself the greatest ad-
vantages. This becomes particularly true where the surface 
owner is not the mineral owner. These conflicts have brought 
the courts in some situations and occasionally in the matter 
of damages, to formulate the proposition that the rights of
each estate owner are correlative, each having a right to 
enjoy his separately owned stick to the fullest extent possible 
without preventing the owner of another stick from enjoying his 
estate likewise. Thus, a grant of the separate minerals with- 
out a right of entry carries with it a right to use the sur-
face to the extent necessary to recover the minerals, but not 
to destroy the entire surface without compensation.
This has led to the exposition of the proposition that 
the lessee has the right to the reasonable use of so much of 
the surface as may be necessary in drilling or production with-
out any apparent reliance on the granting clause. In some cases, 
transgression of this proposition has been seen in terms of 
negligence laws. In others, the use of more land than is rea-
sonable and necessary has been treated as a trespass. This 
treatment, however, may be nothing more than the tendency on 
the part of the courts to bolster a decision by reference to 
a familiar proposition of law. Under the broad terms of the 
grant it would appear that the lessee is entitled to use all 
of the surface, but the court speaks only of the right to use 
so much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for explora-
tion and production. If it is necessary to categorize the 
action for excessive use, it should be as based in contract 
rather than in tort. Of course, the right to use so much of 
the surface as is reasonably necessary could be negligently 
exercised or abused, and in such circumstances might properly
be categorized as a tort, but again it is simply the excessive 
use of the privilege created either by contract or by impli-
cation of law.
Even in the jurisdictions where excessive use has been 
expressed either as a separate ground or as equal to some other 
common law view, there has been confusion in expounding a mea-
sure of damages. The courts are still plagued with the problem 
of whether the damages are permanent or temporary. Where the 
rule of permanent damages is applied, the courts do not seem 
to have taken into account that a portion of the diminution 
value of the whole estate results from an absolute right to 
use so much of the land as is necessary.
Upon the shifting sands of liability, the courts have erected 
a whole super-structure of rules for the measurement of damages 
and have applied them variously in specific cases and not al-
ways consistently in similar situations. These include:
1. Where the damage or injury to land is classi-
fied as permanent, then the measure of damages is 
the difference in fair market value of the property 
before the injury and the fair market value after 
the injury.
2. Where the damage is to crops, the measure of 
damages may be (a) a year's rental value with the 
cost of planting and bringing forward the crop to 
the time of the loss deducted; (b) what the crop 
would bring in its immature stage at a sale; or
(c) proof of the average yield and the market value 
of crops of the same kind planted and cared for in 
the same manner, less the cost of maturing, harvesting 
and marketing.
3. Loss of Livestock. The market value of the live-
stock at the time of loss.
4. Damage to structures on the land. The reasonable 
cost of repair or restoration.
5. Temporary injuries to the land. The cost of 
restoration or loss of rental value.
6. Temporary injuries to livestock. The depreciation 
in weight or value.
7. Special damages which must be pleaded and proved 
such as loss of specific bargains of profits, medical 
expense for livestock and mental anguish of the plain-
tiff as a result of property damage.
8. The value to the lessee for an excessive use of a 
right not otherwise causing damage. (See Quality 
Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves; infra)
The distinction between a permanent injury and a temporary 
injury to land is not always easy to make, and the decided cases 
in oil and gas law have done little to elucidate the problem. 
Often the fact of permanent injury is assumed rather than deter-
mined. As for instance, in damage to water wells cases, which 
do not mention the question of whether another well might be 
successfully drilled for the production of water, it being
apparently assumed that the damage to the existing well per- 
menantly deprives the ownership of any water from wells. 
Furthermore, this method of measuring damages results in 
opinion evidence of so-called experts or appraisers with the 
usual result that the appraisals of before and after damage 
are ridiculously divergent, leaving the jury to choose any 
figure between the high and the low.
In this situation, the man charged with determining what 
to pay in settlement of damages must feel that he is gambling 
with the other fellow's dice.
One of the most extensive judicial discussions of damages 
and the measure of damages is in the case of Frankfort Oil 
Company v. Abrams, 413 P.2d 190, decided by the Supreme Court 
of Colorado in 1966. That case was decided upon the contractual 
rights of the surface owner and the mineral owner under a re-
servation in the deed to the surface owner and a provision in 
a lease by the mineral owner to the lessee, which provided that 
the lessee should be liable "for all damages to the land, live-
stock, growing crops or improvements caused by lessee's opera-
tions on said land." In the opinion the court said: "With-
out a lease provision, the rule seems to be that absent unrea-
sonable use or statutory provision or a suit filed in tort for 
negligence, no payment is due for surface damages due to ex-
ploration or drilling." However, as to the measure of damages 
there was apparent testimony that some portions of the land
were permanently destroyed, and the court noted that both parties 
agreed that the measure of damages was the difference in the 
market value of the land before and after impairment, and the 
court said that that was the correct measure. As to growing 
crops the court found that native grass is a growing crop and 
that the measure of damages for growing crops might be any 
one of three different methods of determination. "One might 
be a year's rental value, with a cost of planting and bringing 
forward the crop until the time of its loss; another, what the 
crop would bring in its immature state at a sale; and a third, 
the proof of the average yield and the market value of crops 
of (the) same kind planted and cared for in the same manner, 
less the cost of maturing, harvesting and marketing."
The recent case of O'Brien v. Primm, 243 Ark. 186, 419 S.W.2d 
323, decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas on October 9, 1967, 
does not specifically pass under the proper measure of damages 
as the points on appeal were limited to the question of whether 
a directed verdict should have been granted. The legal theory 
upon which the case was apparently tried was that the lessee 
negligently performed a sand fract job on an oil well, and 
within a week or so the water in the lessee's water well be-
came unfit for human consumption. Apparently the landowner 
assumed that the permanent injury rule would be applicable 
and produced evidence that the market value with good usable 
water before the sand fract job was $20,000.00, and $8,000.00
to $10,000.00 without good usable water. On the other hand, 
lessee's witnesses used a before and after value of $12,500.00 
and $11,000.00 "based on the value of the two houses and one 
acre of ground with each house and $1,000.00 for drilling a 
new well." The court went on to say: "From this testimony 
and the testimony of appellees as to their inconvenience in 
having to haul water for domestic use, together with the testi- 
mony of Mr. Hamlin as to the two water strata in the area, one 
25 to 30 feet deep and the next 360 feet deep, we are of the 
opinion that appellees submitted ample competent evidence to 
support a jury verdict of $4,000.00." In this case, it would 
appear that causation is supplied by the sudden appearance of 
acid in the landowner's well and negligence can be inferred 
from the vibrations caused by sand fracting. The damages were 
not limited to restoring the water supply at a cost of $1,000.00, 
but the landowner was held entitled to $3,000.00 in addition 
thereto on the theory of permanent damage plus inconvenience 
in having to haul water for domestic use.
In the case of Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948,
403 S.W.2d 54 (May, 1966), Arkansas appeared to have adopted 
the unreasonable use basis for determining liability, for the 
court said: "It is true that an oil and gas lease gives with 
it the right to possession of the surface to the extent rea-
sonably necessary to enable a lessee to perform the obligations 
imposed upon him by the lease. This includes the right to 
enter upon the premises, use so much of it and in such manner
as may be reasonably necessary to carry out the terms of the 
lease and effectuate its purpose." Again, the court did not 
have clearly before it a proper measure of damages, and no 
issue as to the measure of damages appeared before the appellate 
court. It appears from the opinion, however, that there was 
testimony of the landowner and two of his neighbors as to the 
amount of damages as estimated by them for the unreasonable 
use. The damages apparently consisted of using four acres for 
a roadway and two acres for a drill site, though this was dis-
puted as to acreage amount. An additional factor of damages 
was the use of water from a stock pond, causing it to go dry from 
the 25th of May to September. One witness based his estimate 
of damages on what it would take to hire a bulldozer and 
operator to repair the damage. The court commented, without giving 
any details, that there was other evidence that more land was 
used than was reasonably necessary. In this case, an instruction 
told the jury: "It is for the jury to determine what is a 
reasonable use." The Supreme Court brushed an objection to the 
instruction aside on the assertion that it was not prejudicial 
to the lessee. Apparently, so far as can be determined from 
the opinion itself, the jury was given no guide-lines as to what 
is or is not an unreasonable use. No instruction appears which 
takes into account the amount of roadway that a prudent operator 
would build, nor the extent of a drill site that he would use.
The court apparently leaves it to the jury to determine what 
is reasonable or unreasonable.
In the earlier case of Sunray DX Oil Company v. Thurman,
238 Ark. 789, 384 S.W.2d 482 (December, 1964), the court again 
expresses liability in terms of negligence in a case involving 
the escape of salt water from a pit onto surrounding land and 
destroying vegetation to the extent of five or six acres, all 
immediately surrounding the separator used in the production 
of the oil. This expression of negligence as to the basic law 
might well be termed an excessive use. Any negligence in the 
case must be inferred from the fact that during rain, the salt 
water pits overflowed. It was the contention of the lessee in 
that case that the plaintiff did not allege that the salt water 
or waste oil traveled beyond the areas necessarily required by 
the defendant for its oil operations under the lease. The 
court said that it did not understand this statement and 
"appellant seems to indicate by the statement that as a part 
of its normal operations it was entitled to permit the salt 
water to travel over some part of appellee's land. But we do 
not concur in this view. Was it necessary that the salt water 
traveled over the land at all? How did it help appellant's 
oil operation for salt water to overflow the pit? We cannot 
agree with appellant's statement that negligence has not been 
shown, for the evidence reflected that one side of the pit 
was low (whether as a result of faulty construction or erosion), 
and this permitted the salt water to overflow during rainy 
periods." It can hardly be denied that the lessee had the

As to salt water, Arkansas has, since 1957, had an act 
making it mandatory that salt water produced from any newly 
discovered oil or gas field commencing with July 1, 1957, be 
disposed of by the producer of said salt water by either 
putting it in pits or recycling it back into the proper sand. 
Probably it would be held that this statutory obligation would 
require the operator to so construct his pits that salt water 
could not escape either onto the surface or into subterranean 
strata. But this would not affect the rules for measuring 
damages.
There are many other cases in Arkansas, Texas and in 
Oklahoma, as well as other states, with holdings of similar 
import. I am appending a bibliography to this paper for 
those who may have any further curiosity on the subject.
There is one other case I want to call to your specific 
attention. For, although it does not deal with oil and gas, 
it still points out that there are circumstances where with 
neither negligence nor damage there can be a recovery by the 
lessor. This is the case of Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 
206 Ark. 713, 177 S.W.2d 728 (1944). Lessor in that case had 
granted a coal lease and the lessee used a subterranean passage 
not only to haul coal from lessor's land, but from adjacent 
lands. Although the lessee undoubtedly had the right to use 
the underground passageways for hauling coal, the court re-
verted to the concept of trespass and held the lessee liable 
because he had "beneficially occupied the property" by using 
it for purposes not intended by the lessor. Finding no other
rules for the measurement of damages that would result in pay-
ment, the court concluded that the measure of damages was the 
value of the use of the property for transporting coal from 
the adjacent land, thus giving to the lessor an overriding 
royalty on the adjacent coal when removed.
The conclusion is inevitable that the courts, in attempting 
to formulate the rules of liability governing the relationship 
between lessor and lessee in regard to the use of surface land, 
have attempted to apply the law of various kinds of actions and 
adopt the rules for measurements of damages as expressed in 
those actions without giving fair consideration to the right 
of the lessee to use such surface as is reasonable and necessary 
to produce the underground well, although such production bene-
fits both lessor and lessee.
The adoption of the rule of difference in the before and 
after value, as illustrated in the cases heretofore mentioned, 
does result in the lessee often paying full value for the land 
so occupied without receiving any credit for his right to 
occupy so much as is reasonably necessary.
There is no completely satisfactory answer to these in-
equities, though it might be possible to enter into some form 
of an agreement with the lessor as to the use of land for 
drilling and producing operations which would limit or mitigate 
against the consequences of leaving it to a jury to say what 
is unreasonable or excessive use. It might be possible to
develop an agreement between surface owner and lessee setting 
out the measure of damages or stating the amount of land that 
would be considered between them a reasonable use.
Otherwise, there is no good answer to the question of 
what is the measure of damages, and good economics dictates 
that the lessee exercise great care in making use of the sur-
face for his operation, and should damage occur, attempt to 
negotiate a reasonable settlement.
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